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Stopping Deceptive Health Claims: The Need for a Private Right of Action under Federal
Law
Diane E. Hoffmann ∗ and Jack Schwartz ∗∗
I.

INTRODUCTION

Consumers are currently facing a torrent of new health claims as they shop for food and
dietary supplements (hereinafter referred to as “nutritional products”) in grocery stores,
pharmacies, health food stores and on the Internet. 1 Some of these products make claims that
they support immunity, improve memory, 2 and even cure cancer. 3 Such claims appear to
correspond to a growing consumer demand for foods and supplements that improve or maintain
∗
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Development.
1

See, e.g., Editors, Snake Oil in the Supermarket, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN (Aug. 1, 2010),

http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/snake-oil-in-the-supermarket/ (stating that “[f]rom cereals that boost
immunity to yogurts that regulate digestion and juices that keep heart disease at bay, grocery stores in the U.S. are
brimming with packaged foods and beverages that claim to improve health”); see also Caitlin Y. Kandil, What Food
Labels Really Mean, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT HEALTH (Aug. 22, 2012), http://health.usnews.com/healthnews/articles/2012/08/22/what-food-labels-really-mean (stating that you can “[w]alk into any supermarket, and
you’ll find rows of packaged foods boasting how healthy they are”).
2

See Michael Taylor, How the FDA Is Picking its Food Label Battles, THE ATLANTIC (July 19, 2010),

http://www.theatlantic.com/health/print/2010/07/how-the-fda-is-picking-its-food-label-battles/59927/.
3

See David C. Vladeck, Director, Fed. Trade Comm’n Bureau of Consumer Protection, Remarks at the Annual

Symposium for the Dietary Supplement Industry: Priorities for Dietary Supplement Advertising Enforcement 4
(Oct. 22, 2009), http://www.thenhf.com/pdf/VladedckCRNRemarks.pdf.

1

health and wellness. 4 A 2004 survey of U.S. consumers found that purchasing decisions in the
food and dietary supplement markets “are guided almost entirely by product labeling claims.” 5
Among the most persuasive of these are “claims that consumption may confer health benefits.” 6
Claims about health benefits are more persuasive to consumers when they appear to be
authoritative. The problem with seemingly authoritative claims, however, is that most of them
are neither based on rigorous clinical studies nor vetted by any government agency. 7 Some lack

4

In the food arena, these products have been referred to as functional foods, i.e., foods that have a “potentially

positive effect on health beyond basic nutrition.” Katherine Zeratsky, Nutrition and Healthy Eating: What are
Functional Foods?, MAYO CLINIC (Apr. 11, 2015), http://www.mayoclinic.org/healthy-living/nutrition-and-healthyeating/expert-answers/functional-foods/faq-20057816. See also infra notes 37-44 and accompanying text.
5

Leah A. Satine, Is My Yogurt Lying? Developing and Applying a Framework for Determining Whether Wellness

Claims on Probiotic Yogurts Mislead, 63 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 537, 537 (2008).
6

Id. at 538. The Academy of Nutrition and Dietetics links the growing demand for these nutritional products to

rising health-care costs and scientific research supporting a connection between a good diet and a lower incidence of
chronic disease. See Consumers Union of U.S. Inc., ‘Functional Food’ is Hot, but its Claims of Health Benefits Rely
on Flimsy Data, WASH. POST (June 18, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/functionalfood-is-hot-but-its-claims-of-health-benefits-rely-on-flimsy-data/2012/06/18/gJQAWmxflV_story.html.
7

See Matthew Herper & Rebecca Ruiz, Snake Oil in Your Snacks, FORBES (May 20, 2010),

http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2010/0607/health-probiotics-vitamins-supplements-snake-oil-in-snacks.html; see also
Rahi Azizi, “Supplementing” the DSHEA: Congress Must Invest the FDA with Greater Regulatory Authority over
Nutraceutical Manufacturers by Amending the Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act, 98 CAL. L. REV. 439,
440 (2010) (“‘Nutraceutical’ products—functional foods taken to enhance health, like vitamins or herbal and
botanical products intended for ingestion—often carry labels that claim ambiguous benefits, but fail to demonstrate
any measurable degree of efficacy.”).

2

any evidence of effectiveness; 8 others go beyond what is permitted by law. 9 Although this
problem has been recognized for some while, 10 it is compounded by the vigorous marketing of
new product lines, such as probiotics, claiming a wide variety of health benefits. 11 The growing
market for these new products, 12 coupled with lack of reliable studies of their efficacy, 13 create
additional challenges for consumers and regulators. 14
8

See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, DIETARY SUPPLEMENTS: COMPANIES

MAY BE DIFFICULT TO LOCATE IN AN EMERGENCY (Oct. 2012), https://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-01-11-00211.pdf.
See also Herper & Ruiz, supra note 7; see also Azizi, supra note 7.
9

Vladeck, supra note 3, at 2 (stating that “[s]ome marketers of dietary supplements make disease treatment and

prevention claims that far exceed the bounds of the structure/function claims that are permitted under the Dietary
Supplement Health and Education Act (DSHEA)”). See also OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVICES, DIETARY SUPPLEMENTS: STRUCTURE/FUNCTION CLAIMS FAIL TO MEET FEDERAL REQUIREMENTS
(Oct. 2012), https://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-01-11-00210.pdf [hereinafter STRUCTURE/FUNCTION CLAIMS FAIL];
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-662T, HERBAL DIETARY SUPPLEMENTS: EXAMPLES OF DECEPTIVE
OR QUESTIONABLE MARKETING PRACTICES AND POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS ADVICE

(May 26, 2010),

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10662t.pdf (testimony of Gregory D. Kutz, Managing Dir., Forensic Audits and
Special Investigations, U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office) [hereinafter Testimony of Gregory D. Kutz].
10

See, e.g., Norman J. Temple, The Marketing of Dietary Supplements in North America: The Emperor is (Almost)

Naked, 16 J. ALTERNATIVE & COMPLEMENTARY MED. 803 (2010).
11

Probiotics are products with live microorganisms that can confer a health benefit. See JOINT FOOD AND

AGRICULTURE ORG. OF THE U.N./WORLD HEALTH ORG. EXPERT CONSULTATION, REPORT: HEALTH AND
NUTRITIONAL PROPERTIES OF PROBIOTICS IN FOOD INCLUDING POWDER MILK WITH LIVE LACTIC ACID BACTERIA
(Oct. 1-4, 2001), ftp://ftp.fao.org/es/esn/food/probio_report_en.pdf.
12

See Nandhini Rajagopal, The North American Probiotics Market, NATURAL PRODUCTS INSIDER (Oct. 3, 2012),

http://www.naturalproductsinsider.com/articles/2012/10/the-north-american-probiotics-market.aspx. See also Vijaya
K. Gogineni et al., Probiotics: History and Evolution, J. ANCIENT DISEASES & PREVENTIVE REMEDIES (Aug. 2013),
http://esciencecentral.org/journals/probiotics-history-and-evolution-2329-8731.1000107.pdf; Keith Nunes, United

3

Preventing deceptive claims 15 about the health-related benefits of nutritional products is an
important goal of federal and state consumer protection policy. Promoting nutritional products
through deceptive claims can cause a variety of harms. The most obvious is the financial
exploitation of consumers through deceptively induced sales. Even more troubling is the
potential for harm by giving consumers false hope that nutritional products are the best response
to health problems. In the case of some nutritional products, Internet ads claim that they can
improve symptoms related to serious illnesses, including chronic diseases or chronic pain. 16 Such

States Poised to Lead Functional Food Market, FOOD BUS. NEWS (Dec. 10, 2014),
http://www.foodbusinessnews.net/articles/news_home/Business_News/2014/12/United_States_poised_to_lead_f.asp
x?ID=%7B3E104CB5-F892-46A3-B989-4A798CBB1B66%7D&cck=1 (stating that the leading product categories
that will help the U.S. surpass Japan as the number one consumer of functional foods in the world is dairy foods that
contain probiotics and products containing whole grains).
13

See Gregor Reid et al., Potential Uses of Probiotics in Clinical Practice, 16 CLINICAL MICROBIOLOGY REVIEWS

658 (2003) (stating that “[m]any so-called probiotic products have not been properly identified, documented,
manufactured under good manufacturing practices or proven clinically, yet various companies make claims that lead
consumers and caregivers to believe they are using reliable products” ).
14

See Melody J. Slashinski et al., “Snake-oil,” “Quack Medicine,” and “Industrially Cultured Organisms”:

Biovalue and the Commercialization of Human Microbiome Research, BMC MED. ETHICS (Oct. 2012),
http://www.biomedcentral.com/content/pdf/1472-6939-13-28.pdf.
15

In this article, we use the general term “deceptive” to encompass the making of express or implied health claims

that are false, misleading, or unsupported by competent and reliable scientific evidence. The term “unsubstantiated”
refers to the last of these unlawful practices. See generally U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N, ENFORCEMENT POLICY
STATEMENT ON FOOD ADVERTISING (May 13, 1994), https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/1994/05/enforcementpolicy-statement-food-advertising.
16

In remarks to Congress, David Vladeck, former Director of the FTC Bureau of Consumer Protection, stated that

“Consumers suffering from serious health ailments are particularly vulnerable and sometimes desperate. The

4

claims might lead consumers to forgo medically recommended therapies. Consumers who are
taking prescription drugs face the additional risk that some of these products, in particular dietary
supplements, may result in harmful interactions. 17
Claims made by foods and dietary supplement manufacturers are regulated by both the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). 18 FDA regulates
labeling, while the FTC regulates advertising. 19 Under the Food, Drug and Cosmetic (FD&C)
Act, labels on these products must not be false or misleading. 20 Under the FTC Act, claims in
advertising made about foods and dietary supplements may not be “unfair” or “deceptive”. 21
While FDA and the FTC have made some efforts to challenge companies making deceptive
health claims, 22 lack of resources for enforcement, the difficulty of policing advertising on the

marketing of unfounded treatments to such people offers a type of false hope that is particularly cruel.” Vladeck,
supra note 3. Vulnerable populations often include senior citizens and adolescents. See Azizi, supra note 7, at 447.
17

See H-H. Tsai et al., Evaluation of Documented Drug Interactions and Contraindications Associated with Herbs

and Dietary Supplements: A Systematic Literature Review, 66 INT’L J. CLINICAL PRACTICE 1056 (2012).
18

See infra Section III.

19

Advertisements include claims made in newspapers and magazines, on television or radio, online, in the mail, or

on billboards or buses. See Truth in Advertising, U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N, www.ftc.gov/news-events/mediaresources/truth-advertising (last visited Aug. 18, 2015).
20

See 21 U.S.C. § 343(a) (2012); see also infra Section III.A.

21

See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012); see also infra Section III.B.

22

See, e.g., Vladeck, supra note 3; Taylor, supra note 2. See also Sarah Klein, POM-boozled: Do Health Drinks

Live Up to Their Labels?, CNN HEALTH (Oct. 27, 2010),
http://www.cnn.com/2010/HEALTH/10/27/health.pom.drink.labels/ (noting that the FTC and FDA have been
“cracking down on food and beverage makers for allegedly overselling the health benefits of their products”); infra
Section III.C.

5

Internet, and the lure of profit by food and dietary supplement manufacturers make it virtually
impossible for FDA and the FTC to keep pace with the marketing strategies for these products. 23
Moreover, FDA’s regulatory power over these manufacturers has actually declined over the last
few decades due to limitations placed on the agency by Congress and the courts. 24 In addition, it
is unlikely that these enforcement mechanisms adequately deter “quick hit” marketers
unconcerned about long-term business or reputation.
In order to bolster the enforcement tools available to combat the problem of deceptive health
claims for nutritional products, we propose a limited private right of action under the Federal
Trade Commission Act. As background to this proposal, in Section II of this article we expand
on the problem of deceptive health claims for foods and dietary supplements amidst the growing
demand for these products. In Section III, we describe the current legal standards under the
FD&C and FTC Acts and state consumer protection laws governing deceptive claims made by
nutritional product manufacturers and current enforcement efforts aimed at ensuring compliance
with the laws. In Section IV, we describe the limits of existing law and enforcement capabilities
of the relevant federal agencies as well as the limits and shortcomings of state laws and their use
by consumers. In Section V, we describe the benefits, risks and contours of the proposed limited
private right of action, with an emphasis on creating an approach that will augment existing
enforcement tools and lead to more effective consumer protection without undermining
important federal agency control and enforcement goals. In Appendix A, we offer suggested
23

See Natasha Singer, Foods With Benefits, or So They Say, N.Y. TIMES (May 14, 2011),

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/15/business/15food.html; see also infra Section IV.
24

See Editors, supra note 1. See also David Vinjamuri, POM Wonderful’s Deception is the Tip of the Iceberg,

FORBES (May 23, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/davidvinjamuri/2012/05/23/judge-finds-pom-wonderfuladvertising-deceptive-but-thats-just-the-tip-of-the-iceberg/; infra Section IV.

6

language for a statutory amendment to the FTC Act establishing the proposed private right of
action.

II.

THE PROBLEM OF DECEPTIVE CLAIMS IN THE MARKETING OF NUTRITIONAL
PRODUCTS

Several prominent news stories have reported a growing prevalence of deceptive health
claims for nutritional products sold at grocery and drug stores. 25 For example, a 2011 New York
Times article quotes consumer advocates and nutritionists as stating that “shoppers are being
bamboozled by slick marketing” of these products and that these products are not about health,
but about marketing. 26 Similarly, a 2010 Scientific American article warned consumers that many
supermarket health claims are not supported by science and the government does not endorse
them. 27 These articles and others provide numerous examples of companies that lack
substantiation for their claims or even ignore evidence that shows their product clearly does not
do what they claim it does. 28 The claims are being made for two types of products: foods with
25

See Consumers Union of U. S. Inc., supra note 6; Singer, supra note 23; Herper & Ruiz, supra note 7; Matthew

Herper, Wacky Food Health Claims, FORBES (May 19, 2010) http://www.forbes.com/2010/05/19/food-claimssupplements-lifestyle-health-yogurt-margarine.html; Gyorgy Scrinis, That’s Not Natural or Organic: How Big Food
Misleads, SALON (July 20, 2013),
http://www.salon.com/2013/07/20/thats_not_natural_or_organic_how_big_food_misleads/; Garance Burke, Many
Health Supplement Claims Misleading, Illegal, WASH. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2012),
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/oct/3/many-health-supplement-claims-misleading-illegal/?page=all.
26

Singer, supra note 23.

27

Editors, supra note 1.

28

See Herper & Ruiz, supra note 7 (describing how Lifeway Foods, the maker of Probugs, a yogurt-like beverage

for kids, ignored clinical trials results in making its claims).

7

alleged health benefits (also called functional foods 29); and dietary supplements, such as
vitamins, minerals, and herbs, intended to add nutritional value to the diet. Both consumer
groups and government agencies have weighed in on the extent of the problem.
The Center for Science in the Public Interest (CSPI), a consumer advocacy organization with
a mission to carry out “innovative research and advocacy programs in health and nutrition, and to
provide consumers with current, useful information about their health and well-being,” 30 has
made food labeling and deceptive health claims a priority in its advocacy program. In April
2013, the organization initiated its “Stop the Lying Labels” campaign. 31 In an email to members
of a CSPI listserv, Michael Jacobson, the organization’s executive director, stated that in his
forty-plus years of dealing with the food industry, he has “never encountered such bold
deception and disregard for the law” as he sees now in the area of food labeling. 32

29

See Zeratsky, supra note 4.

30

Mission Statement, CTR. FOR SCIENCE IN THE PUB. INTEREST, http://cspinet.org/about/mission.html (last visited

Aug. 18, 2015).
31

Michael F. Jacobson, CSPI’s Year-End Report to the Membership, CTR. FOR SCIENCE IN THE PUB. INTEREST (Nov.

7, 2013), http://cspinet.org/about/CSPI-Year-End-Report-2013.pdf.
32

E-mail from Michael Jacobson, Exec. Dir., Ctr. for Science in the Pub. Interest, to Diane Hoffmann, Professor of

Law, Univ. Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law (Apr. 29, 2013, 08:31 EST) (on file with author). Jacobson
provides the following examples: “General Mills’ false claims that some of its corn-syrup-drenched products are
‘natural’. . . Coca-Cola Company’s deceptive health claims about its Vitamin water (which would be better called
Sugar water). . . Amway’s deceptive claims about “immunity system boosters” in its Nutrilite products (which do
nothing to boost your immunity). . . Campbell’s misleading labeling about sodium in its soups by pretending that
people consume smaller serving sizes . . . and Dr. Pepper Snapple group’s made-up claims of benefits from the
antioxidants it adds to some of its 7UP sugar drinks, which promote obesity, not health.” Id.

8

Similarly, government reports and statements have been critical of claims being made by
dietary supplement manufacturers—in particular, structure/function claims. 33 The criticism is
that these claims go outside the bounds of the regulatory limits on them and bleed into the
disease claim (i.e., drug) category, 34 thus requiring premarketing approval by FDA, or that
manufacturers have not done the studies necessary to substantiate their claims. In 2010, the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued a report in which it described numerous
examples of deceptive or questionable marketing practices by dietary supplement manufacturers
and retailers. Most egregious of the practices they found were suspect claims that a dietary
supplement “prevented or cured extremely serious diseases, such as cancer and cardiovascular
diseases” or that it reduced the symptoms of Alzheimer’s disease. 35
The FTC has also asserted that the food and dietary supplement industries are making health
claims that are often “false or unproven.” In particular, the agency cites a “trend in food
advertising toward making unproven claims that eating certain foods can improve health and
even reduce the risk of serious illnesses such as prostate cancer and heart disease.” 36
33

These are “statements that describe the role of a nutrient or dietary ingredient intended to affect the structure or

function in humans or that characterize the documented mechanism by which a nutrient or dietary ingredient acts to
maintain such structure or function . . . .” 21 C.F.R. § 101.93(f) (2014). See infra notes 78-82 and accompanying
text.
34

See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: STRUCTURE/FUNCTION CLAIMS, SMALL ENTITY

COMPLIANCE GUIDE (Jan. 9, 2002),
http://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceRegulation/GuidanceDocumentsRegulatoryInformation/DietarySupplements/uc
m103340.htm. See infra notes 60 and 61 and accompanying text.
35

Testimony of Gregory D. Kutz, supra note 10.

36

Health and Fitness Claims, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/media-resources/truth-

advertising/health-claims (last visited Aug. 18, 2015).

9

While there is little hard evidence of the extent of the problem, a walk through a supermarket
or pharmacy reveals the pervasiveness of health claims on product labels. Moreover, the growing
demand for these products suggests that the problem will increase over the next several years.
Markets for both dietary supplements and functional foods are booming. A 2012 Department of
Health and Human Services (DHHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) report on
structure/function claims about dietary supplements states that in this country, “dietary
supplements are a $20 billion-per-year industry and are used by 80 percent of adults for a wide
range of purposes.” 37 The worldwide market for these products is also flourishing. According to
a 2013 article in Forbes, “[o]ne of the fastest growing industries in the world is the nutritional
supplement group. . . . Producing about $32 billion in revenue for just nutritional supplements
alone in 2012, it is projected to double that by topping $60 billion in 2021.” 38 The FTC suggests
on its website that consumers have turned to supplements as a result of a “downturn in the
economy” and as a way to “avoid expensive doctor visits and prescription medications.” 39

37

STRUCTURE/FUNCTION CLAIMS FAIL, supra note 9, at 1 (citing Natural Products Foundation, What is the Current

Economic Contribution of the Dietary Supplement Industry to the U.S. Economy?, NATURAL PRODUCTS FOUND.
(rev. Mar. 2011), https://www.npainfo.org/App_Themes/NPA/docs/policy/Econ%20One%20sheet%20311%20final.pdf). See also Farin Kamangar & Ashkan Emadi, Vitamin and Mineral Supplements: Do We Really
Need Them?, 3 INT’L J. PREVENTIVE MED. 221 (2012) (estimating total sales of nutritional supplements in the
United States in 2010 to have been over $28 billion).
38

David Lariviere, Nutritional Supplements Flexing Muscles as Growth Industry, FORBES (Apr. 18, 2013),

http://www.forbes.com/sites/davidlariviere/2013/04/18/nutritional-supplements-flexing-their-muscles-as-growthindustry/ (citing figures from the Nutritional Business Journal).
39

Health and Fitness Claims, supra note 36.

10

The market for functional foods and beverages is growing at an even greater rate than dietary
supplements, with the global market for these products reaching over $170 billion in 2013. 40
According to one source, “this booming category now accounts for 5% of the overall food
market and is driving growth for the food industry as a whole.” 41 This same source also
attributes this sales growth to consumers looking to these products as a health solution. In
particular, consumers are looking to functional foods as a way to manage “chronic conditions,
such as diabetes, [cardio-vascular disease] or obesity.” 42 Claimed benefits of these foods include
boosting energy levels, improving or maintaining gut, bone and heart health, managing weight,
and sharpening mental faculties. 43 One of the fastest growing segments of both the dietary
supplement and functional food markets is probiotics, in large part due to manufacturers’ claims
for the role of probiotics in wellness and health improvement. 44

40

Maggie Hennessy, What’s Driving Growth in Functional Food and Beverages? A Convergence of Nutrition,

Convenience and Taste, NUTRAINGREDIENTS-USA.COM (Sept. 27, 2013), http://www.nutraingredientsusa.com/Markets/What-s-driving-growth-in-functional-food-and-beverages-A-convergence-of-nutritionconvenience-and-taste.
41

Id.

42

Id.

43

PRICE WATERHOUSE COOPERS, LEVERAGING GROWTH IN THE EMERGING FUNCTIONAL FOODS INDUSTRY: TRENDS

AND MARKET OPPORTUNITIES

9 (Aug. 2009), http://www.pwc.com/us/en/transaction-

services/publications/assets/functional-foods.pdf.
44

See Hank Schultz, Supplement Sales Hit $11.5 Billion in U.S., Report Says, NUTRAINGREDIENTS-USA.COM (Sept.

20, 2012), http://www.nutraingredients-usa.com/Markets/Supplement-sales-hit-11.5-billion-in-U.S.-report-says
(stating that in terms of different segments of the dietary supplement market, “digestive supplements are doing very
well right now, especially probiotics”). See also International Probiotics (Functional Foods, Dietary Supplements,
Specialty Nutrients, Animal Feed) Market – Forecasts to 2019, MARKETWIRED (July 2, 2014),

11

The functional food market consists of a number of large multinational companies, 45 but
smaller participants are “successfully creating and defending niches in the market.” 46 Large
segments of the market include soft drinks (primarily enhanced water and energy drinks) and
dairy products, especially yogurts. Both consumer demand and the potential for premium pricing
by manufacturers and retailers 47 are attracting suppliers to this market.
Some observers differentiate between major manufacturers of nutritional products, with
significant investments in brand reputations, and smaller manufacturers, some of which operate
on the fringe of legality. Steve Mister, president of the Council for Responsible Nutrition, a
trade association representing dietary supplement and functional food manufacturers, describes
the supplement business as a “tale of two industries. There's a mainstream, responsible industry.
Then there is this sort of shadow industry, the smaller guys playing around the fringes. The

http://www.marketwired.com/press-release/international-probiotics-functional-foods-dietary-supplements-specialtynutrients-animal-1926353.htm; Jane E. Brody, Putting Good Bacteria to Work, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 14, 2004),
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/14/health/14brod.html; supra note 12.
45

Multinationals in the functional food market include PepsiCo, Coca-Cola, General Mills, Kellogg, Kraft, Nestle,

Danone, Unilever and Yakult. See PRICE WATERHOUSE COOPERS, supra note 43, at 8.
46

PRICE WATERHOUSE COOPERS, supra note 43, at 5.

47

See id. at 10 (stating that “[a]lthough these products typically require greater initial R&D and ingredient costs,

price premiums may reach 30 percent or higher, depending on the product”).

12

problem is how we distinguish between the two.” 48 He characterizes some members of the
industry as “rogue players” who “are poisoning the reputation of the industry” for everyone. 49

III.

REGULATION OF HEALTH CLAIMS AND RECENT EFFORTS TO COMBAT DECEPTIVE
CLAIMS

Federal statutes regulating deceptive health claims include the Food Drug and Cosmetic
Act, 50 the Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act, 51 the Nutrition Labeling and Education
Act, 52 and the Federal Trade Commission Act. 53 Each statute, augmented by agency regulations

48

Alison Young, Unmasking the People Behind Risky Pills: A USA Today Investigation, USA TODAY (Dec. 20,

2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/12/19/dietary-supplements-executives-criminal-recordsspiked/4114451/.
49

Steve Mister, The Supplement Industry’s ‘Identity’ Crisis, NATURAL PRODUCTS INSIDER (Feb. 10, 2012),

http://www.naturalproductsinsider.com/articles/2012/02/the-supplement-industry-s-identity-crisis.aspx (describing
mislabeling and the use of substandard ingredients).
50

Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399).

51

Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-417, 108 Stat. 4332 (codified at 21

U.S.C. §§ 301, 321, 342-343, 350(b) and 42 U.S.C. §287).
52

Nutrition Labeling and Education Act (NLEA) of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-535, 104 Stat. 2353 (codified at 21

U.S.C. § 343).
53

15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (2012). The Lanham Act also establishes a cause of action for false advertising. See 15 U.S.C.

§ 1125(a) (2012). However, only those who allege an injury to commercial interests have standing to bring a
Lanham Act false advertising claim; consumers do not. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134
S. Ct. 1377, 1390 (2014). See also POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 134 S. Ct. 2228, 2234 (2014).
Although consumers do not have a right of action under the Lanham Act, theories of Lanham Act liability and
related burden of proof obligations may be pertinent to analysis of a state law based false advertising claim. See In
re GNC Corp., 789 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 2015).

13

and guidance documents, has a separate framework for establishing when claims violate the law.
In addition to these federal laws, state consumer protection laws provide standards for making
claims about consumer products and another enforcement avenue for consumers harmed by
deceptive advertising.
A. FDA
FDA is responsible for assuring that foods and dietary supplements are properly labeled
and, if they make claims about the products, that such claims are not false or misleading. 54 Food
labeling is in large part governed by the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act (NLEA) of 1990,
which requires most foods to include nutrition labeling and “requires food labels that bear
nutrient content claims and certain health messages to comply with specific requirements.” 55 In
addition, under the FD&C Act, foods and dietary supplements may not be adulterated or
misbranded. 56 A product is misbranded if its label is “false or misleading in any particular” 57 or
it is not in compliance with labeling requirements. 58 As to claims, FDA statutes and regulations
permit manufacturers of foods and dietary supplements to make three types of claims on their
labels: health, nutrient content, and structure/function claims. 59 Foods and dietary supplements

54

21 U.S.C. §§ 331(a), 343(a) (2012).

55

U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., A FOOD LABELING GUIDE (Jan. 2013),

http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Food/GuidanceRegulation/UCM265446.pdf [hereinafter A FOOD LABELING GUIDE].
56

21 U.S.C. §§ 342-343 (2012).

57

§ 343(a)(1).

58

§ 343(a)(2).

59

See Label Claims for Conventional Foods and Dietary Supplements, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Dec. 2013),

http://www.fda.gov/Food/IngredientsPackagingLabeling/LabelingNutrition/ucm111447.htm [hereinafter Label
Claims].
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may not make disease claims, which are claims that describe the effect of a substance on the
diagnosis, treatment, mitigation, cure or prevention of disease. 60 Any product that makes a
disease claim is considered a drug and must go through the extensive and costly drug approval
process prior to marketing. 61
Of the three types of claims permissible for dietary supplements and foods, only claims in the
health claim category require premarket approval by FDA. These claims include “health claims”
and “qualified health claims.” Prior to 1990, health claims on food products were prohibited. It
was only after the passage of the NLEA 62 that health claims were permitted. 63
FDA defines health claims as claims made on the label or in labeling of a food or dietary
supplement that characterize the relationship between the labeled substance and reduced risk of a
disease or health-related condition. 64 Health claims for foods and dietary supplements may be
approved by FDA if there is “significant scientific agreement” that the claimed relationship
between the nutritional product and reduction of risk of disease is true. FDA responds to a
petition for approval and authorizes these types of health claims based on an extensive review of
the scientific literature and by promulgation of a specific regulation permitting the claim. 65 An

60

See § 321(g)(1).

61

See Development & Approval Process (Drugs), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Oct. 27, 2014),

http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/ (describing the drug approval process).
62

Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-535, 104 Stat. 2353 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 343).

63

Id. See also Constance J. Geiger, Health Claims: History, Current Regulatory Status, and Consumer Research, 98

J. AM. DIETETIC ASS’N 1312 (1998).
64

U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., A FOOD LABELING GUIDE, supra note 55, at 80.

65

See Label Claims, supra note 59. This mechanism of approval for health claims was established by the Nutrition

Labeling and Education Act of 1990. Id.
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example of a health claim approved under this process is “adequate calcium throughout life, as
part of a well-balanced diet, may reduce the risk of osteoporosis”. 66
Under the Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997 (FDAMA),
manufacturers may also make health claims for foods (but not dietary supplements) if the health
claim is based on an “‘authoritative statement’ from a scientific body of the U.S. Government 67
or the National Academy of Sciences.” 68 A food manufacturer or distributor that intends to make
such a claim must submit a notification to FDA, which has 120 days to respond if it finds that the
notification does not comply with FDAMA. 69 Marketing under this route does not require
promulgation of a regulation; however, FDA may prohibit or modify such a claim by
regulation. 70

66

Health Claims: Calcium, Vitamin D, and Osteoporosis, 21 C.F.R. § 101.72(e) (2014).

67

Label Claims, supra note 59. FDAMA specifically lists the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and the Centers for

Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) as scientific bodies that would satisfy the statutory requirement. 21 U.S.C.
§ 343(r)(2)(G)(i) (2012). FDA has also stated that the Surgeon General within the Department of Health and Human
Services, the Food and Nutrition Service, the Food Safety and Inspection Service, and the Agricultural Research
Service within the Department of Agriculture, may serve as qualified “scientific bodies.” See Guidance for
Industry: Notification of a Health Claim or Nutrient Content Claim Based on an Authoritative Statement of a
Scientific Body, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (July 11, 1998),
http://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceRegulation/GuidanceDocumentsRegulatoryInformation/LabelingNutrition/ucm0
56975.htm [hereinafter Notification of a Health Claim].
68

Label Claims, supra note 59.

69

In such case, the submitter may revise the notification and resubmit it. The food may not be marketed with the

revised claim until at least 120 days after resubmission. Notification of a Health Claim, supra note 67.
70

Id.
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An additional type of health claim, the “qualified health claim” (QHC), was established by
FDA in response to a court’s decision that a dietary supplement manufacturer has a First
Amendment right to make health claims based on less scientific evidence than the standard of
“significant scientific agreement,” as long as such claims do not mislead consumers. 71 QHCs
can be made for both foods and dietary supplements and differ from other health claims in that
they must include a disclaimer or be otherwise qualified. 72 Manufacturers or distributors
wishing to make a QHC must submit a petition to FDA summarizing the scientific data in
support of the claim the petitioner wishes to make, including copies of computer literature
searches, all research articles relied upon for support of the petition, and information about any
adverse consequences from the food or dietary supplement for any segment of the U.S.
population. 73

71

See Pearson v. Shalala, 164 F.3d 650 (D.C. Cir. 1999). In Pearson, the plaintiffs (dietary supplement

manufacturers) challenged FDA’s health claim regulations for dietary supplements and the agency’s decision not to
approve health claims for four specific substance/disease relationships. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit held that the First Amendment does not permit the FDA to reject health claims that the agency determines to
be potentially misleading, unless the agency also reasonably determines that no disclaimer would eliminate the
potential deception. Id.
72

An example of a QHC is: “One small study suggests that chromium picolinate may reduce the risk of insulin

resistance. . . FDA concludes, however, that the existence of such a relationship . . . is highly uncertain.” Qualified
Health Claims: Letter of Enforcement Discretion – Chromium Picolinate and Insulin Resistance (Docket No.
2004Q-0144), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Aug. 25, 2005),
http://www.fda.gov/Food/IngredientsPackagingLabeling/LabelingNutrition/ucm073017.htm.
73

See A FOOD LABELING GUIDE, supra note 55, at 83. This guidance document states:
Within 15 days of receipt, FDA will acknowledge the petition. Within 45 days of receipt, FDA
will file the petition and a docket number will be assigned. . . . At the time of filing, FDA will post
the petition on the FDA webpage for a 60-day public comment period. During this time, written
comments may be submitted to the docket. On or before 270 days after receipt of the petition, a
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Food manufacturers may make a second type of claim, “nutrient content claims.” Subject to
FDA’s criteria, 74 a manufacturer may make claims, for example, that a product is good,
excellent, enriched/fortified or high potency with respect to vitamins, minerals, fiber, or protein;
that a product is “lite” or “light” with regard to calories or sodium; or even that a product is
“healthy.” 75 Such claims can be used on labels without review by FDA, as long as they comply
with all FDA definitions and rules. 76 All other nutrient content claims are prohibited. 77
Foods and dietary supplement manufacturers can also make structure/function claims, 78
which are claims that describe the role of a nutrient or dietary ingredient intended to affect the
normal structure or functions of the body in humans. 79 Although there is no premarket approval
final decision will be sent to the petitioner in the form of a letter as to whether FDA intends to
exercise enforcement discretion with respect to a QHC or deny the petition. The letter will be
posted on FDA’s website. Extensions beyond 270 days can be granted upon mutual agreement
between the petitioner and the agency.
Id.
74

Id. at 87.

75

Id. at 91–94. Historically the claim “healthy” “has received special scrutiny and guidelines from the FDA because

“[it] is a very useful advertising term. According to FDA guidelines, a product must have low total fat content as
well as low levels of saturated fat, sodium, and cholesterol to qualify as a ‘healthy’ food.” Betty J. Parker, Food for
Health-The Use of Nutrient Content, Health, and Structure/function Claims in Food Advertisements, J.
ADVERTISING, Fall 2003, at 47, 48–49. See also 21 C.F.R. § 101.65(d)(2) (2014).
76

FDA deems a food misbranded if it bears a nutrient content claim unless the agency has issued a regulation

authorizing the claim and the claim is made consistent with the regulation. 21 U.S.C. § 343(r)(6) (2012).
77

U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., A FOOD LABELING GUIDE, supra note 55, at 72 (citing 21 C.F.R. § 101.13(b)).

78

Along with structure/function claims, the Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act of 1994 (DSHEA) also

permits general well-being and nutrient deficiency disease claims for dietary supplements. Neither of these claims is
subject to premarket approval. See Label Claims, supra note 59.
79

STRUCTURE/FUNCTION CLAIMS FAIL, supra note 9, at 4 (“For example, a supplement may claim that it ‘curbs

appetite to help with weight loss,’ but it may not claim to ‘aid weight loss to treat obesity’ because obesity is a
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for these claims, the manufacturer is responsible for ensuring their truthfulness and for having
substantiation to support the claims. 80 For dietary supplements (but not foods) making
structure/function claims, the manufacturer must notify FDA within 30 days of placing the
product on the market. The notification must include an attestation by the manufacturer that the
“[manufacturer] has substantiation that the claim is truthful and not misleading.” 81 In addition,
dietary supplement manufacturers making structure/function claims must include a disclaimer
that the claim has not been evaluated by FDA and that the product is “not intended to ‘diagnose,
treat, cure or prevent any disease.’” 82
Of each of the three types of claims that nutritional product manufacturers may make,
structure/function claims are especially problematic in terms of consumer deception. The fact
that these claims do not require premarket approval creates at least the opportunity for claims

disease. Similarly, a supplement may claim to ‘support immunity,’ but may not claim to ‘boost the immune system
against colds and flu’ because the latter references specific diseases.”).
80

See id. FDA has set forth guidance on what types of evidence can be used for claim substantiation. See Guidance

for Industry: Substantiation for Dietary Supplement Claims Made Under Section 403(r)(6) of the Federal Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Dec. 2008),
http://www.fda.gov/food/guidanceregulation/guidancedocumentsregulatoryinformation/dietarysupplements/ucm073
200.htm. To meet the substantiation requirement, evidence must be “competent and reliable scientific evidence.” Id.
In determining whether the standard is met, FDA considers: “(1) the meaning of the claim(s) being made; (2) the
relationship of the evidence to the claim; (3) the quality of the evidence [e.g., randomized controlled trials are given
considerable weight although manufacturers may use other human or nonhuman studies]; and (4) the totality of the
evidence [both favorable and unfavorable.]” Id.
81

STRUCTURE/FUNCTION CLAIMS FAIL, supra note 9, at 6 (citing 21 C.F.R. § 101.93(a)(2) (2014)).

82

Label Claims, supra note 59.
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that lack scientific support and even outright false statements. 83 Structure/function claims are
also used much more frequently than health claims apparently because they allow companies to
bypass the approval process required for health claims. 84 The OIG and GAO have issued several
reports critical of structure/function claims, especially as they relate to dietary supplements. 85
B. FTC
The FTC’s requirements regarding substantiation for health related product claims differ
from those of FDA. Unlike FDA, the FTC does not require pre-market approval of claims, nor
does it make regulatory distinctions between product categories (e.g., drug, supplement, food),
nor between types of claims (e.g., health, nutrient content, structure/function). 86 However, the
FTC has legal authority to take action against false or misleading claims for many types of
products and services. These include foods, drugs, and dietary supplements. 87
83

See CSPI REPORTS: INT’L, Marketplace Implications and Consumer Impact, in FUNCTIONAL FOODS: PUBLIC

HEALTH BOON OR 21ST CENTURY QUACKERY? (1998), https://cspinet.org/reports/functional_foods/usa_market.html.
84

See Parker, supra note 75, at 49. See also CSPI REPORTS INT’L, supra note 83 (stating that “[t]o avoid FDA

approval requirements, some companies have begun making structure/function claims in lieu of health claims.”).
85

STRUCTURE/FUNCTION CLAIMS FAIL, supra note 9; OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN

SERVICES, DIETARY SUPPLEMENT LABELS: AN ASSESSMENT (Mar. 2003), https://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-01-0100121.pdf; Testimony of Gregory D. Kutz, supra note 9; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,GAO-09-250,
REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS: DIETARY SUPPLEMENTS: FDA SHOULD TAKE FURTHER ACTIONS TO
IMPROVE OVERSIGHT AND CONSUMER UNDERSTANDING (Jan. 2009), http://www.gao.gov/assets/290/285372.pdf.
86

Michelle Rusk, Att’y, U.S. Fed. Trade Comm’n, Div. of Advertising Practices, Staff Presentation at the Inst. of

Medicine Food Forum Workshop: Health Claims and FTC Advertising Law (Feb. 23, 2012),
http://iom.nationalacademies.org/~/media/1EBC076FE7CC4AC0BB922166367899FC.ashx.
87

See Anne V. Maher, Marketing Dietary Supplements and Functional Foods in the USA: The Federal Trade

Commission’s Advertising Substantiation Requirements, in NUTRACEUTICAL AND FUNCTIONAL FOOD REGULATIONS
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The FTC’s jurisdiction over health claims stems from three provisions of the FTC Act.
Section 5 of the Act prohibits “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.” 88
Section 12 prohibits false advertisements for foods, drugs, devices, services, or cosmetics, 89 and
Section 15 defines false advertisement for the purpose of section 12 as one that is “misleading in
a material respect.” 90 In a separate policy statement, FTC has explained that in its enforcement of
these provisions it looks to whether the claim contains a misrepresentation or omission of fact
that is likely to mislead a consumer acting reasonably under the circumstances, and whether that
representation is material to a consumer’s purchasing decision. 91 Thus false claims, claims made
without disclosure of material facts, or unsubstantiated claims may all violate the law.
The FTC interprets ads from the perspective of a reasonable consumer in the target
audience. 92 For some advertising, this audience is the general population. If, however, a
manufacturer targets its product to a particular subgroup, the ad will be evaluated from the
perspective of how it is likely to be interpreted by a reasonable member of that group. 93
Although ads may have more than one reasonable interpretation, where an ad conveys more than
one meaning, only one of which is misleading, a seller is liable for the misleading interpretation
IN THE UNITED STATES AND AROUND THE WORLD

47, 48 (Debasis Bagchi ed., 2008), (stating that the FTC “has

authority to take legal action against false and misleading claims for nearly every type of product and service,
including products which are also regulated by the . . . FDA, such as dietary supplements and functional foods.”).
88

15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012).

89

§ 52.

90

§ 55(a)(1).

91

FTC Policy Statement on Deception, U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N (Oct. 14, 1983), https://www.ftc.gov/public-

statements/1983/10/ftc-policy-statement-deception.
92

Id.

93

Id.
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even if non-misleading interpretations are possible. 94 Consumers may be especially susceptible
to health claims, because they usually lack the knowledge to assess claims referring to
physiology or metabolic processes and may be especially impressed by purported scientific
evidence bolstering the claims. 95
In the FTC’s long-held view, making claims without a reasonable basis is a deceptive
practice. In determining whether there is a “reasonable basis” for a claim, the FTC will consider:
“the type of claim, the product, the consequences of a false claim, the benefits of a truthful claim,
the cost of developing substantiation for the claim, and the amount of substantiation experts in
the field believe is reasonable.” 96 Where an advertisement represents, either expressly or by
implication, that the claim is supported by a certain amount or level of substantiation, the
advertiser must possess, at the time the claim is made, at least that level of support for the
claim. 97

94

Id.

95

For example, POM Wonderful, the marketer of pomegranate juice products claimed to have various health

benefits, “thought their products [sic] impact on health was such a strong selling point that they invested over $35
million to develop supporting evidence that they could use in marketing.” In re POM Wonderful LLC, 155 F.T.C. 1,
42 (2013).
96

FTC Policy Statement Regarding Advertising Substantiation, U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N (Mar. 11, 1983),

https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/1983/03/ftc-policy-statement-regarding-advertising-substantiation; see also
DIETARY SUPPLEMENTS: AN ADVERTISING GUIDE FOR INDUSTRY 8–9 (2001),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/plain-language/bus09-dietary-supplements-advertising-guideindustry.pdf ; see also In re Pfizer Inc., 81 F.T.C. 23 (1972).
97

FTC Policy Statement Regarding Advertising Substantiation, supra note 96. See also Enforcement Policy

Statement on Food Advertising, U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N (May 13, 1994), https://www.ftc.gov/publicstatements/1994/05/enforcement-policy-statement-food-advertising [hereinafter Food Policy Statement]. FTC’s
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Although the FTC does not have separate rules governing foods and dietary supplements, it
has issued industry guidance documents for both products. 98 The Commission’s Enforcement
Policy Statement on Food Advertising was made public in May 1994. This was prior to the
passage of DSHEA, which as discussed above, allows dietary supplement manufacturers to make
structure/function claims without FDA approval prior to marketing. As a result, the statement
focuses on health claims and nutrient content claims. The subsequent passage of DSHEA raised
numerous questions about the FTC’s approach to applying its consumer protection laws to
dietary supplements. The guidance document for dietary supplement manufacturers states that
the FTC’s “approach to supplement advertising is best illustrated by its Enforcement Policy
Statement on Food Advertising” and that in general the FTC gives “great deference to an FDA
determination of whether there is adequate support for a health claim.” 99
Both guidance documents provide that health-related claims must be substantiated by
competent and reliable scientific evidence. 100 More specifically, this is evidence consisting of
tests, analyses, research, studies or other evidence based on the expertise of
professionals in the relevant area, conducted and evaluated in an objective manner

Bureau of Consumer Protection website on “Health Claims” states that “Companies must support their advertising
claims with solid proof. This is especially true for businesses that market food, over-the-counter drugs, dietary
supplements, contact lenses, and other health-related products.” Health Claims, U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N,
http://business.ftc.gov/advertising-and-marketing/health-claims.
98

See Food Policy Statement, supra note 97; see DIETARY SUPPLEMENTS: AN ADVERTISING GUIDE FOR INDUSTRY,

supra note 96.
99

DIETARY SUPPLEMENTS: AN ADVERTISING GUIDE FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 96, at 1.

100

Id. at 9; Enforcement Policy Statement on Food Advertising, supra note 97.
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by persons qualified to do so, using procedures generally accepted in the
profession to yield accurate and reliable results. 101
In evaluating health claims for foods and dietary supplements the FTC will look to “welldesigned studies, including clinical research and other forms of reliable and probative scientific
evidence.” 102 Furthermore, the FTC states that it will apply the same “significant scientific
agreement” standard applied by FDA to claims “about the relationship between a nutrient or
substance in a food and a disease or health-related condition.” 103
In evaluating a structure/function claim for a dietary supplement, the FTC will assess
whether the claim may convey an implied claim that the product will treat a disease. If so, the
manufacturer will need to provide substantiation of the implied disease treatment claim. 104 The
industry guidance document for dietary supplements states that for substantiation there “is no
fixed formula for the number or type of studies required or for more specific parameters like
sample size and study duration. There are, however, a number of considerations to guide an
advertiser in assessing the adequacy of the scientific support for a specific advertising claim.” 105
These include whether the advertiser has the level of support it claims to have; whether experts
101

DIETARY SUPPLEMENTS: AN ADVERTISING GUIDE FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 96, at 9; Enforcement Policy

Statement on Food Advertising, supra note 97.
102

Enforcement Policy Statement on Food Advertising, supra note 97.

103

Id.

104

The FTC industry guidance document on advertising dietary supplements provides an example of this:
An ad for a dietary supplement called ‘Arthricure’ claims that the product maintains joint health
and mobility into old age. The ‘before’ picture shows an elderly woman using a walker. The
‘after’ picture shows her dancing with her husband. The images and product name likely convey
implied claims that the product is effective in the treatment of the symptoms of arthritis, and may
also imply that the product can cure or mitigate the disease. The advertiser must be able to
substantiate these implied claims.

DIETARY SUPPLEMENTS: AN ADVERTISING GUIDE FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 96, at 5.
105

Id. at 9.
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in the relevant area of study would generally agree that the amount and type of evidence for the
particular claim is sufficient; whether any research conducted was well designed, implemented
and analyzed; whether the totality of the evidence supports the claim; and whether the evidence
is relevant to the specific claim. 106
Although FDA regulates labeling, the FTC will also evaluate dietary supplement labels if
they are being used by an advertiser to promote the product and will follow an approach similar
to FDA’s review of such materials in the context of labeling. 107

C. Recent Enforcement Efforts by FDA and the FTC Against Nutritional Product
Manufacturers for Deceptive Claims
Under a memorandum of understanding (MOU) originally executed in 1954, FDA and the
FTC share jurisdiction for enforcement of claims made by manufacturers of health-related
products. 108 The FDA has primary authority for overseeing the advertising of prescription drugs
and the labeling 109 of drugs, supplements, foods, devices and cosmetics. With the exception of
106

Id. at 9–18.

107

Id. at 24.

108

The allocation of responsibility for enforcement of food and dietary supplement labels and claims is set forth in a

memorandum of understanding between the two agencies. See Memorandum of Understanding Between the Federal
Trade Commission and The Food and Drug Administration (1971), MOU 225-718003,http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/PartnershipsCollaborations/MemorandaofUnderstandingMOUs/DomesticMO
Us/ucm115791.htm.
109

Labeling is interpreted broadly to include “visual, audio or other material that bears a strong contextual

relationship to the product.” John E. Villafranco & Andrew B. Lustigman, Regulation of Dietary Supplement
Advertising: Current Claims of Interest to the Federal Trade Commission and National Advertising Division, 62
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 709, 711 (2007) (citing 21 U.S.C. § 321(m) and Kordel v. United States, 335 U.S. 345 (1948)).
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prescription drugs, the FTC has primary authority for overseeing advertising of health-related
products. The MOU did not address claims made on the Internet, but “both agencies have
asserted jurisdiction over claims appearing on company websites.” 110 The agencies coordinate
closely on food and dietary supplement policy issues. 111
FDA and the FTC have a variety of enforcement tools available to address deceptive claims.
For example, FDA can ask companies to voluntarily recall any product that has already entered
the distribution chain. 112 In addition, FDA can send a warning letter to a firm stating that
enforcement actions may be forthcoming if corrections are not made. 113 If violations are not

110

Maher, supra note 87, at 48.

111

See John E. Villafranco, Raqiyyah R. Pippins, & Kristi L. Wolff, Working Together: How Growing FDA And

FTC Collaboration Changes the Regulatory Landscape for Food and Dietary Supplement Marketers, NUTRITION
OUTLOOK (May 2011),
http://www.kelleydrye.com/publications/articles/1485/_res/id=Files/index=0/Villafranco_Pippins_Wolff_Working%
20Together_Nutritional%20Outlook_%20May%202011.pdf (“Early in the Obama Administration, the FDA and
FTC expressed a commitment to interagency collaboration in regulating the promotion of food, beverage, and
dietary supplement products, and established ‘working groups’ to share information regarding marketing activities
for such products.”). See also Sarah Roller & Raquiyyah Pippins, Marketing Nutrition & Health-Related Benefits of
Food & Beverage Products: Enforcement, Litigation & Liability Issues, 65 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 447 (2010).
112

See 21 CFR §§ 7.40-7.42, 7.45 (2014).

113

See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Warning Letters, in REGULATORY PROCEDURES MANUAL,

http://www.fda.gov/iceci/compliancemanuals/regulatoryproceduresmanual/ucm176870.htm (last visited Aug. 19,
2015).
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corrected, FDA can seize and remove the product from the marketplace. 114 Both FDA and the
FTC can enjoin a firm from continuing a practice that violates labeling or advertising statutes
and regulations, i.e., seek an injunction 115 or cease and desist order. In addition, the FDA can
recommend criminal prosecution of a company engaging in criminal conduct, 116 and the FTC
can assess civil monetary penalties, order refunds to consumers, and require corrective
advertising, disclosures, and other informational remedies aimed at rectifying the deception. 117
During the mid-2000s, FDA was criticized by public interest groups, Congress and the GAO
for its inability to keep up with the prevalence of food labeling violations by taking necessary
enforcement actions. 118 CSPI pointed out the small number of warning letters issued by the
114

See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Seizure, in REGULATORY PROCEDURES MANUAL,

http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/ComplianceManuals/RegulatoryProceduresManual/ucm176733.htm (last visited Aug.
19, 2015).
115

U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Injunctions, in REGULATORY PROCEDURES MANUAL,

http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/ComplianceManuals/RegulatoryProceduresManual/ucm176734.htm (last visited Aug.
19, 2015).
116

See 21 U.S.C. § 333(a)(1) (2012); U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Prosecution, in REGULATORY PROCEDURES

MANUAL, http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/ComplianceManuals/RegulatoryProceduresManual/ucm176738.htm (last
visited Aug. 19, 2015); see also John W. Lundquist & Sandra L. Conroy, Defending Against Food & Drug
Prosecutions, THE CHAMPION (July 1997), http://www.nacdl.org/CHAMPION/ARTICLES/97jul02.htm. While the
law allows for civil monetary penalties against drug and medical device manufacturers it does not provide for civil
penalties for violations by food and dietary supplement manufacturers. See 21 U.S.C. § 335b (2012).
117

Advertising FAQ’s: A Guide for Small Business, U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N (Apr. 2001),

https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/guidance/advertising-faqs-guide-small-business.
118

See Nicole Negowetti, Food Labeling Litigation: Exposing Gaps in the FDA’s Resources and Regulatory

Authority, GOVERNANCE STUDIES AT BROOKINGS 8 (June 2014),
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2014/06/26-food-labeling-litigation/negowetti_food-
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agency in light of the apparent growing numbers of labels that did not comply with the law and
asserted that FDA had “all but abdicated its responsibility to police inaccurate nutrition
statements and misleading health-related claims on food labels.” 119 In 2009 and 2010, FDA
issued two open letters to the food industry urging manufacturers to comply with labeling
requirements and in 2010, as part of an enforcement initiative, issued seventeen Warning Letters
in one day to food manufacturers that were alleged to have made unsubstantiated or misleading
health and nutrient content claims. 120 From January 2011 to June 2012, FDA issued “numerous
warning letters” to food manufacturers for failure to comply with requirements for food labeling
and health claims. 121 Since June 2012, FDA has continued to issue warning letters at the rate of
about sixty per year 122 to food and dietary supplement manufacturers whose labels or claims
labeling-litigation.pdf (citing Center for Science in the Public Interest, Rebuttal to FDA Report to Congress on
Agency Enforcement Actions Regarding Health-Related Claims on Food Labels (July 18, 2006),
http://cspinet.org/new/pdf/fn5rep.pdf [hereinafter Rebuttal to FDA Report]; S. REP. NO. 109-92, at 153 (2005); H.R.
REP. NO. 109-102, at 83 (2005); and U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-597, FOOD LABELING: FDA
NEEDS TO BETTER LEVERAGE RESOURCES, IMPROVE OVERSIGHT AND EFFECTIVELY USE AVAILABLE DATA TO HELP
CONSUMERS SELECT HEALTHY FOODS (Sept. 2008), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/do8597.pdf).
119

Negowetti, supra note 118 (quoting Rebuttal to FDA Report).

120

Id. See also ABA Section of Litigation, Food & Supplements Second Annual Workshop, Food Labeling: How to

Avoid an FDA or FTC Enforcement Action 3 (June 12, 2012),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/litigation/materials/2012_food_supplements_2nd_annu
al_cle_wrkshp/2012_aba_panel3_food_labeling_how_to_avoid_an_fda_or_ftc_enforcement_action.authcheckdam.p
df; Summary of 17 Warning Letters Issued by FDA on February 22, 2010 for Alleged Food Labeling Violations,
KELLER AND HECKMAN LLP (Feb. 22, 2010), http://www.khlaw.com/3640.
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violate the law but has not generally engaged in other methods of enforcement against these
companies. 123 Moreover, FDA has issued very few warning letters for certain types of claims,
specifically qualified health claims. According to a recent article, the “FDA has issued only
seven warning letters referencing qualified health claims” and has stated that “promotional
health-related claims are not a high enforcement priority.” 124
The FTC has been somewhat more active in enforcement of laws under its jurisdiction
regarding deceptive health claims. 125 In a prepared statement given to the Senate Special
Committee on Aging as part of a hearing on deceptive marketing of dietary supplements in 2010,
the FTC stated that over the past decade (2000-2010) it had filed “well over 100 law enforcement
actions challenging claims about the efficacy or safety of a wide variety of supplements” 126 and

Compliance and Enforcement Update-Food and Dietary Supplements, GIBSON DUNN (Mar. 2, 2015),
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/2014-Year-End-FDA-Compliance-and-Enforcement-UpdateFood-and-Dietary-Supplements.pdf (stating that in 2014 FDA issued 252 warning letters for conventional foods and
58 for dietary supplements. The letters for foods primarily cited violations of current good manufacturing practices
while those for dietary supplements were for what we have described as deceptive health claims, i.e., improperly
marketing products as dietary supplements when those products were actually new drugs.)
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See Warning Letters, supra note 122.
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INSIDE COUNSEL MAGAZINE (Jan. 9, 2015), http://www.insidecounsel.com/2015/01/09/enforcement-of-fdaqualified-health-claims-whos-on.
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Deceptive Marketing of Dietary Supplements: FTC Enforcement Activities, U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N 4 (May
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that it “focused its enforcement on national advertising campaigns for products with unproven
benefits, products promoted to treat or cure serious diseases, products that may present
significant safety concerns to consumers, and products that are deceptively marketed to
vulnerable populations, such as children or the elderly.” 127 Recent examples of major FTC
enforcement actions include cases against Nestlé Healthcare Nutrition, Inc. (a subsidiary of
Nestlé S.A.), the Dannon Company, and POM Wonderful, LLC.
In 2010, the FTC brought an action against Nestlé Healthcare Nutrition, Inc. for claims made
about its product, Boost Kid Essentials. 128 The product is a nutritional drink for children with
probiotics embedded in a straw that comes with the drink. Advertisements for the product
claimed that consumption of the drink would reduce illness in children, protect children from
colds and flu by strengthening their immune system, and help children up to age thirteen recover
more quickly from diarrhea. The FTC alleged in a complaint brought against the manufacturer
that these claims were unsubstantiated and thus violated the FTC Act. This was the agency’s first
complaint challenging deceptive advertising of a probiotic product. In response, the company
agreed as part of a settlement to stop claiming that BOOST Kid Essentials would (1) reduce the
risk of colds, flu, and other upper respiratory tract infections unless the FDA approved the
claim 129 and (2) “reduce children’s sick-day absences and the duration of acute diarrhea in

“over the last decade, the FTC has filed one hundred and twenty cases challenging health claims made for
supplements.”).
127
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Kid Essentials, U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N (Jan. 18, 2011), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
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children up to age 13, unless the claims [were] true and backed by at least two well-designed
human clinical studies.” 130
In a second action in 2010, the FTC entered into a settlement with the Dannon Company, Inc.
after alleging in a complaint that the company had engaged in deceptive advertising by
exaggerating the health benefits of its Activia yogurt and DanActive dairy drink. 131 In its
complaint the FTC stated that “Dannon claimed in nationwide advertising campaigns that
DanActive helps prevent colds and flu, and that one daily serving of Activia relieves temporary
irregularity and helps with ‘slow transit time’” without sufficient evidence to back these
claims. 132 Similar to the settlement with BOOST Kid Essentials, the FTC required that Dannon
refrain from claiming that “any yogurt, dairy drink, or probiotic food or drink reduces the

releases/2011/01/ftc-approves-final-order-settling-charges-nestle-subsidiary-made. The FTC further required that
the regulation be based on a finding that “there is significant scientific agreement among experts qualified by
scientific training and experience to evaluate such claims, considering the totality of publicly available scientific
evidence.” Nestlé HealthCare Nutrition, Inc.; Analysis of Proposed Consent Order to Aid Public Comment, 75 Fed.
Reg. 42,752, 42,753 (July 22, 2010).
130

FTC Approves Final Order, supra note 129. The settlement also prohibits Nestlé HCN “from making any claims

about the health benefits, performance, or efficacy of any probiotic and nutrition drinks that it sells at retail, unless
the claims are true and backed by competent and reliable scientific evidence” and “from misrepresenting any tests or
studies.” Id.
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likelihood of getting a cold or the flu, unless the claim is approved by the Food and Drug
Administration.” 133
Another enforcement action involved the pomegranate juice products marketed by POM
Wonderful. On September 24, 2010, the FTC issued an administrative complaint alleging that
POM Wonderful engaged in deceptive acts and practices and disseminated false advertising in
violation of Sections 5(a) and 12 of the FTC Act, through the marketing of its juice and related
products. 134 On review of an administrative law judge’s initial decision, the FTC found that
POM Wonderful had made deceptive claims in thirty-six advertisements. 135 The FTC held that
POM Wonderful, without adequate substantiation, had made disease efficacy claims—namely,
that its products could treat, prevent, or reduce the risk of heart disease, prostate cancer, and
erectile dysfunction and that they were clinically proven to work. 136 For example, several ads
claimed that “eight ounces of POM a day can reduce plaque in the arteries by up to 30%!” The
FTC wrote that “[s]uch references tend to communicate that the product’s attributes are
supported by scientific research because a reduction in the amount of plaque in an individual’s

133

Id. Prior to this action by the FTC, in 2009 the Dannon Co. settled a false advertising lawsuit regarding these

products brought by private plaintiffs. See Timothy Williams, Dannon Settles With F.T.C. Over Some Health
Claims, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 15, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/16/business/16yogurt.html; see also infra
notes 161-163 and accompanying text.
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arteries cannot be known through casual observation, i.e., it must be measured by a medical
professional.” 137
The FTC prohibited POM Wonderful from making disease-related efficacy claims unless the
claims are supported by “competent and reliable scientific evidence,” which the FTC defined as
at least two clinical trials that are “randomized, well controlled, based on valid end points, and
conducted by persons qualified by training and experience to conduct such studies.” The agency
further required that the studies “yield statistically significant results, and . . . be double-blinded
unless [POM Wonderful could] demonstrate that blinding [could not] be effectively implemented
given the nature of the intervention.” 138 POM Wonderful appealed the FTC’s order, arguing that
the FTC erred in its findings, imposed an unlawful remedy by requiring two randomized clinical
trials, and transgressed First Amendment protection of commercial speech. The D.C. Circuit,
however, largely rejected POM Wonderful’s contentions, holding that the FTC had substantial
evidence in support of its findings and that POM Wonderful’s claims were not entitled to First
Amendment protection. 139 One modification ordered by the appellate court related to the
remedy: the FTC’s requirement for two clinical trials in support of disease-related claims was
deemed unjustifiably rigid and hence a First Amendment violation; one high-quality trial might
suffice to substantiate a claim. This modification is significant in that it pushes back on the
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agency’s efforts to harmonize its regulation of health claims with FDA, in particular its
substantiation requirement. 140
The FTC has continued to bring high-profile enforcement actions against other foods and
dietary supplement manufacturers over the past few years. According to the 2014 Year-End FDA
Compliance and Enforcement Update on food and dietary supplements, prepared by the law firm
Gibson Dunn, in 2014 the FTC “stepped up its scrutiny of health-related claims,” in particular
for weight loss products, and announced that deceptive health claims remained “an ongoing FTC
priority with respect to deceptive advertising practices.” 141
D. State Consumer Protection Laws
Most states have what are commonly “referred to as ‘mini-FTC’ Acts or UDAP (Unfair
or Deceptive Acts or Practices) laws.” 142 While these laws vary across states, most state UDAP
laws provide state attorneys general with a broad array of remedies to combat consumer fraud
and deception. UDAP statutes have also been used by private litigants in class action suits for
alleged unfair and deceptive business practices. 143
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See Villafranco, Pippins, & Wolff, supra note 111. See also Douglas W. Hyman, The Regulation of Health
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settlements, most of which required the defendants to substantiate any future weight-loss claims with at least two
adequate and well-controlled human studies.” Id.
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UDAP statutes generally allow a state enforcement agency, usually the attorney general, to
obtain a court order prohibiting a seller from engaging in a particular unfair or deceptive
practice. 144 An attorney general may also ask the court to impose civil monetary penalties for
violations of the law and to order the seller to return payments to consumers. 145 For example, the
California Attorney General used that state’s UDAP law to seek injunctive relief and civil
penalties for allegedly unsubstantiated claims that certain ingredients in a multi-vitamin pill
could protect against prostate cancer. 146 Despite differences in state UDAP laws, it is possible for
attorneys general to act collectively, if a national marketer is engaged in the same practices in all
states. 147
Most statutes also allow consumers to seek similar remedies, e.g., “return of payments or
compensation for . . . consumer loss, . . . injunction[s] against repetition of the deceptive
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Practices Statutes, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CENTER 6 (Feb. 2009),
http://www.msfraud.org/law/lounge/UnfairandDeceptiveActs09.pdf.
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(Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 26, 2010) (No. 37-2010-0010-3098-CU-MC-CTL),
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practices, and, in most states, reimbursement for attorneys’ fees.” 148 According to a 2009 report
by the National Consumer Law Center, “[b]efore the adoption of state UDAP statutes in the
1970s and 1980s, neither consumers nor state agencies had effective tools against fraud and
abuse in the consumer marketplace.” 149 Moreover, in most states, there was no state agency
responsible for combatting consumer fraud and abuse. 150 Claims based on common law fraud
posed numerous obstacles to consumers who would have to, for example, establish the seller’s
state of mind. 151 Even if a consumer had a reasonable chance of success, finding an attorney to
take the case was challenging, as few states had any provisions for reimbursing consumers for
attorneys’ fees. 152
In recent years, consumers and public interest groups have used state UDAP laws to
challenge food labeling and health claims. The Center for Science in the Public Interest has been
a leader in these legal actions, often initiating a lawsuit or joining with other plaintiffs. In several
cases the Center’s legal action preceded suits filed by state attorneys general. Examples of the
latter include cases against Coca-Cola for making fraudulent claims about Enviga, an artificially
sweetened green tea soda, 153 and Bayer Healthcare, for claims that its One A Day men’s
148

See Carter, supra note 144, at 6.
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Id. at 5.
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Id.
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Id.
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Coca-Cola marketed the drink as a weight loss product claiming that it had “negative calories” and labeled it as

“the calorie burner” on its cans. CSPI scientists reviewed the studies relied on by Coke and determined that Enviga
was simply “a highly caffeinated and overpriced diet soda.” Watchdog Group Sues Coke, Nestlé, for Bogus
“Enviga” Claims, CTR. FOR SCIENCE IN THE PUB. INTEREST (Feb. 1, 2007),
http://www.cspinet.org/new/200702011.html. In 2007, CSPI filed suit alleging that the claims “were made without
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multivitamins reduced the risk of prostate cancer. 154 While very few CSPI cases have been
finally adjudicated, they have resulted in numerous settlements with food and dietary supplement
manufacturers. 155 Moreover, in some cases CSPI threatened but did not file suit and was able to
negotiate a change in labeling or claims with the manufacturer. 156
In addition to the legal actions brought by CSPI and state attorneys general, consumer
advocacy groups have brought numerous suits. Just over the last four years consumers have filed
“more than 150 . . . class action lawsuits against food and beverage companies.” 157 Most of the
suits have been for alleged violations of food labeling laws. Others have been for claims that,
although not directly violating FDA food labeling laws, are alleged to be misleading under state
prior substantiation and no evidence that most consumers would realize any calorie-burning benefit.” Negowetti,
supra note 118, at 17 (“Following the filing of this lawsuit, approximately 28 state attorneys general investigated the
claims and ultimately settled for $650,000.”). The company also agreed to stop making overt weight-loss claims for
the product. Id.
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lawsuit was dismissed on procedural grounds, while CSPI was preparing to refile “the Attorneys General of Oregon,
California, and Illinois announced a broad settlement with Bayer on the same issues.” Litigation Project-Closed
Cases, Ctr. for Science in the Pub. Interest, http://cspinet.org/litigation/closed.html (last visited Aug. 19, 2015).
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law. Many of the suits have involved foods labeled as “all natural,” 158 “nutritious,” or
“healthful.” 159 Although almost none of these lawsuits have as yet been adjudicated, 160 in some
instances, the litigation has resulted in significant settlements. For instance, in 2010 the Dannon
Company settled a false advertising lawsuit and agreed to establish a $35 million fund to
reimburse consumers who bought its Activia and DanActive yogurts. 161 The class action lawsuit
alleged that Dannon made misrepresentations when marketing its Activia and DanActive yogurts
by claiming nonexistent health benefits. 162 The settlement may have paved the way for
subsequent lawsuits. 163

IV.

LIMITATIONS OF LAW AND ENFORCEMENT CAPACITY

A. FDA
158

The large majority of cases (over 100) have alleged that food products have inappropriately used the label

“natural” and that use of the term is misleading. See id. at 11.
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Id. at 10.
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See Amended Stipulation of Settlement at 8, Gemelas v. The Dannon Company, Inc., 2010 WL 377068 (N.D.
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to make changes to the labeling and advertising of Activia and DanActive. Stipulation of Settlement, Gemelas v.
The Dannon Company, Inc., 2009 WL 3197886 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 18, 2009) (No. 1:08-cv-00236). DanActive labels
that said the yogurt has “a positive effect on your digestive tract’s immune system” were reworded to say the yogurt
will “interact with your digestive tract’s immune system.” Id.
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While FDA has stepped up its actions against food and dietary supplement
manufacturers, the agency is hindered in its ability to curtail illegal claims in part because of
limitations on its enforcement authority and enforcement methods. FDA’s “principal
enforcement tool” when confronted with a noncompliant food label “is to issue a Warning Letter
to notify the manufacturer.’ 164 Although FDA has other enforcement mechanisms that are more
severe, including recall, seizure, civil monetary penalties, and injunctive relief, the law
significantly limits their use in cases of misbranding. 165 As a result, according to one author, “the
FDA primarily seeks voluntary compliance from food companies when food products are
misleading or mislabeled” and these “Warning Letters provide little incentive or threat for
companies to avoid or discontinue use of misleading claims on food labels.” 166
FDA is also limited in its ability to monitor health claims that bypass required premarket
approval or nutrient content claims that are not consistent with pre-approved claims. In addition,
because structure/function claims do not require pre-market approval, FDA is stymied in its
ability to ensure that these claims are backed up by scientific evidence. Although dietary
164

Id. at 3.
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See id. at 4 (citing 21 U.S.C. §§ 333(f)(2)(a), 334 (a)(1), 336) (stating that “The FDA may enforce compliance

with a recall order or impose civil monetary fines when adulteration or misbranding of food ‘will cause serious
adverse health consequences of death,’ such as when a label is missing allergen information. The FDA may
condemn and seize misbranded foods only after the company receives proper notice and the opportunity to respond
and the FDA has ‘probable cause to believe . . . that the misbranded article is dangerous to health, or that the
labeling of the misbranded article is fraudulent, or would be in a material respect misleading to the injury or damage
of the purchaser or consumer.’ Injunctions or criminal prosecutions are rarely used for food misbranding because the
FD&C Act expressly provides that these enforcement actions should not be initiated for ‘minor violations’ when the
‘public interest’ may be adequately served by a written warning.”).
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Id.
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supplement manufacturers must submit a notification to FDA of their claim 30 days prior to
marketing their product, “[t]he number of manufacturers that do not submit structure/function
claims to FDA is unknown.” 167 FDA reviews all notifications submitted by dietary supplement
manufacturers to ensure they meet “the definition of a structure/function claim. If [they do] not,
FDA sends a letter to the manufacturer notifying it that the claim is not in compliance and
follows up as needed.” 168 A fundamental gap in the agency’s enforcement ability is that the law
does not require manufacturers to submit the substantiation the manufacturer relied on to make
its claim and, unlike the FTC, FDA “may not compel manufacturers to produce substantiation
upon request.” 169 As a result, FDA “has limited authority to enforce the substantiation
requirement” 170 and many manufacturers do not have adequate substantiation for their claims. 171
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substantiation documents “on a purposive sample of 127 dietary supplements marketed for weight loss or immune
system support in retail stores and on the Internet.” Id. at 7. The OIG found that “[i]n contrast to FDA guidance,
most substantiation was not derived from human studies,” and “10 percent of the documents appeared to have no
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Moreover, once a product is on the market, if FDA believes that a structure/function claim is not
truthful or is misleading, in any legal proceeding the burden is on FDA to prove that the claim is
false or misleading 172 rather than on the manufacturer to prove that the claim is true and not
deceptive.
FDA has also been limited in its enforcement efforts by First Amendment protections of
commercial speech. As discussed in Section III. A. above, the entire category of “qualified health
claims” came into being as a result of litigation establishing that FDA must allow claims with
less than substantial evidence of their truth as long as they include disclaimers. The agency
cannot simply bar such claims unless it can meet the burdensome test of demonstrating the
inadequacy of the disclaimer. 173
A further constraint on FDA’s enforcement capabilities is lack of resources. In order to weed
out noncompliant food labels and deceptive claims, FDA must rely on consumer complaints,
proactive monitoring of Internet advertising, and physically reviewing labels at retail stores. 174
The latter two methods might root out more regulatory violations but are extremely laborintensive. FDA has conceded that it is overwhelmed and is “struggling to police this booming

12–16. Ten percent of the documents submitted did not qualify as substantiation – for example, one was a “30-yearold handwritten college term paper.” Id. at 15.
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See Pearson v. Shalala, 164 F.3d 650, 659 (D.C. Cir. 1999). See also Alliance for Natural Health v. Sebelius, 714
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market.” 175 In a letter published in The Atlantic in 2010, Michael Taylor, FDA Deputy
Commissioner for Foods, confirmed that the agency can only reach the tip of the iceberg of
noncompliant claims, stating that although FDA issued 20 enforcement letters to food companies
that were marketing misbranded products in February 2010, these letters “addressed just a small
subset of the universe of products making dubious marketing claims.” 176 He further stated that
although FDA would undoubtedly issue more letters on labeling violations, he did not see FDA
“eradicating questionable health claims . . . any time soon,” given that FDA has “no pre-market
review authority over such claims, and, under prevailing legal doctrines concerning ‘commercial
free speech,’ the evidentiary requirements placed on FDA to prove that such claims are
misleading are significant and costly to meet.” 177 Moreover, he acknowledged that FDA is
“conscious of the cleverness of marketing folks, . . . Going after them one-by-one with the legal
and resource restraints [the agency] work[s] under is a little like playing Whac-a-Mole, with one
hand tied behind your back.” 178
Mr. Taylor’s reference to “resource constraints” reflects a mismatch between FDA’s
statutory responsibilities and its budget that has been noted more generally by former HHS
Secretary Tommy Thompson. According to Thompson, who spoke at an Institute of Medicine
meeting on Challenges for the FDA,
the FDA has been chronically underfunded in carrying out its responsibilities for
ensuring the safety of drugs, medical devices, and the nation’s food supply. While
the FDA is commonly viewed as the global gold standard for consumer
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protection, it faces stiff competition for scarce resources and over the past 20
years has been tasked to do far more with its limited resources. 179
More recently, David Kessler, former FDA Commissioner and a board member of CSPI,
stated that “[t]he importance of CSPI’s Stop the Lying Labels campaign is only going to grow in
these days of slashed government budgets, when agencies cut back on even their most basic
public services.” 180

B. FTC
While the FTC has recently taken a number of actions against food and dietary
supplement manufacturers for deceptive claims, there are also significant limitations on the
FTC’s approach to these violations of the law. Although the FTC has a broad range of
enforcement actions it can take against manufacturers, it frequently relies on voluntary consent
orders to gain compliance from offending companies. 181 When a company signs such an order, it
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INST. OF MEDICINE, CHALLENGES FOR THE FDA: THE FUTURE OF DRUG SAFETY, WORKSHOP SUMMARY 15

(2007), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK52930/pdf/TOC.pdf . See also Associated Press, FDA
Commissioner Margaret Hamburg: 2013 Budget Cuts Mean Less Safe Food, POLITICO (Feb. 28, 2013),
http://www.politico.com/story/2013/02/fda-commissioner-margaret-hamburg-2013-budget-cuts-mean-less-safefood-88241.html.
180

E-mail from Michael Jacobson to Diane Hoffmann, supra note 32. See also Taylor, supra note 2 (“establishing ‘a

systematic regulatory framework to prohibit misleading health-related claims’ . . . is a noble goal and one we can
readily embrace conceptually. But it’s a tall order, especially considering the other high-priority nutrition and food
safety initiatives that compete for FDA’s finite resources.”).
181

Alexandra Ledyard, Snake Oil in Your Pomegranate Juice: Food Health Claims and the FTC, 47 U.S.F. L. REV.

783, 794 (2013).

43

need not admit that it violated the law, only that it will stop the practices identified by the
agency. 182
Also, like FDA, the FTC has limited enforcement resources and, given the number of
companies marketing nutritional products, it cannot investigate and prosecute every case. 183 As a
result, the FTC tends to target large companies, hoping that these actions will be a deterrent to
other companies engaging in similar practices. Whether this strategy deters other large
companies is unclear, but it is unlikely that it prevents smaller businesses from advertising their
products on the Internet with deceptive claims. The bifurcated nutritional product industry—
with a handful of multinational corporations and hundreds of smaller businesses, a number of
which have been described as “rogue” or “fringe” operators 184—creates challenges for the
182
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federal agencies attempting to regulate that market. To the extent that such fringe players seek
quick profits from deceptive practices and then shift corporate identities, they present a
particularly difficult target for FDA and FTC enforcement efforts. 185

C. State consumer protection laws
While consumers are taking advantage of state UDAP laws to bring suits against nutritional
product manufacturers making deceptive claims, there are also problems and inefficiencies to
such state-based action. These problems include: 1) limits on the substantive provisions of state
laws and differences in what they prohibit; 2) uncertainty as to how state courts will rule in these
cases; 3) potential inconsistencies in outcomes from state to state as well as potential
inconsistencies with federal enforcement policies; and 4) potential for over-reaching by plaintiffs
who seek damages by bringing suits without a bona fide claim in hopes of an inflated settlement.
As to the first of these, the National Consumer Law Center has observed that state UDAP
statutes are too variable and constricted to be a strong deterrent to false health claims:
The effectiveness of UDAP laws varies widely from state to state. The holes are
glaring. Legislation or court decisions in dozens of states have narrowed the scope
of UDAP laws or granted sweeping exemptions to entire industries. Other states
have placed substantial legal obstacles in the path of officials charged with UDAP
enforcement, or imposed ceilings as low as $1,000 on civil penalties. And several
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states have stacked the financial deck against consumers who go to court to
enforce the law themselves. 186
Also, although the large majority of the claims seem to be brought in California, private litigants
in California (and other states) are unable to argue that an advertised health benefit is deceptive
because it lacks substantiation. California courts have stated:
Claims that rest on a lack of substantiation, instead of provable falsehood, are not
cognizable under the California consumer protection laws. . . . Challenges based
on a lack of substantiation are left to the Attorney General and other prosecuting
authorities; private plaintiffs, in contrast, have the burden of proving that
advertising is actually false or misleading. 187
This can be a significant burden. 188
As to the second and third problems, while over 100 cases have been brought against food
manufacturers by litigants in state courts, almost none have been decided, creating uncertainty as
to whether the state laws actually will be interpreted in a way that will lead to positive outcomes
for plaintiffs, or indeed whether state courts will play a positive role in developing sound public
policy regarding health claims. The latter is of particular concern to FDA and the FTC, which
seek consistency across enforcement actions. The proliferation of suits, in the absence of some
186

Carter, supra note 144, at 3. See also NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CENTER, Appendix B: State-by-State Summaries of

State UDAP Statutes, in CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE STATES (Jan. 10, 2009),
https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/udap/analysis-state-summaries.pdf.
187

Bronson v. Johnson & Johnson, Inc., 2013 WL 1629191, *8 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2013) (No. C 12-04184 CRB).

See also, e.g., Scheuerman v. Nestlé Healthcare Nutrition, Inc., 2012 WL 2916827, *6 (D.N.J. July 17, 2012) (Nos.
10-3684(FSH)(PS), 10-5628(FSH)(PS)).
188

See, e.g. In re GNC Corp. 789 F.3d 505, 513–16 (4th Cir. 2015) (holding that a claim cannot be literally false (as

distinct from misleading) if even one expert agrees with it). But see also Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Pantron I Corp., 33
F.3d 1088, 1100 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that the FTC “is not required to prove that a products is ‘wholly
ineffective’ in order to carry its burden of showing that the seller’s representations of product efficacy are ‘false’”).

46

overall framework, potentially undermines the federal agencies’ goal of a coherent and
authoritative set of laws and policies to guide the regulated community. From the perspective of
risk-averse nutritional product manufacturers, inconsistencies in outcomes from state to state
would create costly uncertainty, 189 as well as the burden of having to market their products
differently in different states.
Finally, as to the fourth problem, the opportunity for generous damages for plaintiffs and
contingency fees for their attorneys may lead to overreaching, i.e., bringing suits that lack
legitimacy. A manufacturer might make a business judgment to settle such claims, despite their
lack of merit, in order to avoid the costs associated with protracted litigation. 190

V.

A LIMITED FEDERAL PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION AS A SUPPLEMENT TO GOVERNMENT
ENFORCEMENT
Laws that empower government agencies to protect consumers are predicated on market

failure: in many areas, “key information necessary for consumers to make a sensible choice
between rival brands, or to decide whether to buy the product at all, is absent.” 191 Yet, this
corrective itself can fail when the federal enforcement regime is disproportionately small,
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measured against the size or nature of the marketplace to be policed. “[R]egulation is only as
good as the enforcement mechanisms underlying it.” 192
One congressional response to the problem of insufficient federal protection of statutory
consumer rights has been to enlist state attorneys general as additional law enforcers. For
example, the Consumer Product Safety Act authorizes state attorneys general to seek injunctive
relief for a violation “that affects or may affect such State or its residents . . . .” 193 Similar
provisions may be found, for instance, in the Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse
Prevention Act, 194 the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act, 195 and the Restore Online
Shoppers’ Confidence Act. 196
A second strategy is to broaden enforcement even more, by granting rights of action to nongovernmental actors. One commentator’s summary of the rationale for private rights of action to
vindicate civil rights laws is no less persuasive for consumer protection laws: “Even [a] . . .
well-funded, vigorous public enforcement agency could only do so much. Private litigation
engages a multitude of private actors to bring their resources to rooting out [unlawful
activity].” 197
192
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Within the broad category of consumer protection laws, Congress has authorized private
rights of action in, for example, the Consumer Product Safety Act, 198 the Fair Credit Reporting
Act, 199 the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 200 and the Real Estate Settlements Procedures Act. 201
Within the narrower category of consumer protection laws aimed at preventing deceptive
marketing practices, private rights of action are found in the Hobby Protection Act, 202 the

1973) (Solomon, J., dissenting). It is well established that there is no private right of action under the FTC Act. See,
e.g., Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corporation, 485 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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National Gold and Silver Stamping Act, 203 and the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”). 204 Referring
to TILA, the FTC has stated as follows: “Since the Act provides for a private right of action, use
of that provision should be encouraged where the public interest and the cost benefit [sic]
indicate that Commission action is not warranted.” 205
As discussed in Sections II and IV above, the market for nutritional products is marred by
claims of benefit that consumers are unable to evaluate on their own and that government
enforcement agencies are unable to police adequately—in the FDA’s case, because of limitations
on its regulatory authority over many of these products; in both the FDA’s and FTC’s case,
because their resources are insufficient given the breadth of their responsibilities. Nor are state
consumer protection laws sufficient, given nationwide marketing and the difficulty of pursuing
elusive out-of-state defendants. 206 Hence, correcting abuses in this market segment entails

§ 2101(a), (b) (2012). The statute authorizes “any interested person” to seek injunctive relief and damages for
violations and provides for costs and attorneys’ fees. 15 U.S.C. § 2102 (2012).
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augmented enforcement of existing federal law, through the grant of a right of action to nonfederal parties.
Set against this point is the argument that such a right of action poses risks to the agencies’
role in setting policy. State attorneys general have different constituencies and political
incentives, “open[ing] up new outlets for state-centered policy” at variance with what federal
agencies might perceive to be in the broader national interest. 207 Non-federal litigants, for
example, might seek to apply the broad standard of “unfair or deceptive” conduct in ways
inconsistent with criteria developed by the FTC. 208 In addition, private litigants may have
economic incentives to bring actions primarily for the purpose of extracting settlements from
possibly innocent defendants, akin to the concern about “strike suits” in class action securities
fraud litigation. 209
Seeking to balance the competing considerations of expanding enforcement opportunities for
non-federal agencies and concerns of federal agencies for developing a set of coherent laws and
consistent policies, we propose that Congress allow a limited group of non-governmental
plaintiffs to seek enforcement of FTC Act standards in the advertising and marketing of
nutritional products. Creating a federal private right of action but limiting those who may bring
actions to state attorneys general and consumer protection organizations should make it easier for
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these public interest oriented plaintiffs to coordinate and work together. This federal private
right of action should be an attractive and more efficient alternative to bringing actions under
each state’s consumer protection laws.
The following are the key features of the proposed Nutritional Products Consumer Protection
Act. Appendix A provides draft statutory language for an amendment to the Federal Trade
Commission Act embodying these features.
Products covered (§(a)(1) and (2)). The Act would apply to “nutritional products,” a term
encompassing “food” and “dietary supplements.” The latter two terms would be defined as
they are in the FD&C Act.
Substantive requirement (§(b)). The Act would prohibit those who sell nutritional products
in interstate commerce from engaging in “an unfair or deceptive act or practice, within the
meaning of Section 5 of [the FTC] Act.” This incorporation of FTC Act standards allows
the extensive body of law developed over the last century to be applied to the marketing of
nutritional products and would deter plaintiffs from advancing novel theories of liability
unmoored to this body of law. This provision is also drafted to ensure against
encroachments on FDA’s authority by providing that a seller’s “use of any material that has
been reviewed and approved by [FDA] may not be deemed to be a violation” of the Act.
Plaintiffs authorized (§(a)(3)). As discussed above, Congress has frequently empowered
state attorneys general to bring enforcement actions under statutes otherwise reserved for
federal agency enforcement. We propose a similar role in this statute. Consumer protection
lawyers in the offices of state attorneys general are experienced litigators, familiar with the
“unfair or deceptive” standard. Given competing priorities and shrinking budgets, however,
state attorneys general may not themselves be able to achieve the desired deterrent effect.
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Hence, we propose that the right of action be extended to a limited group of private
attorneys general: non-profit organizations. Non-profits such as the Center for Science in
the Public Interest 210 and the Consumer Federation of America 211 have relevant expertise
concerning food and nutrition and an organizational commitment to preventing the harm of
false or unsubstantiated claims. 212 Affording a right of action to attorneys general and
expert non-profit organizations would harness their resources to protect consumers in a
marketing arena badly needing additional enforcement without serious risk of “overzealous
or otherwise socially undesirable enforcement efforts.” 213
Remedies (§(c)). Injunctive relief and damages would be authorized. To provide the
incentive common in consumer protection legislation, the proposed Act would allow for the
award of attorneys’ fees to a prevailing plaintiff.
Preservation of FDA/FTC authority (§(d) and (e)(1)). The Act would require advance
notice of an action to the FDA and FTC and would afford the two agencies an
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unconditional right to intervene. 214 All existing FDA and FTC enforcement authority
would be unaffected.
Non-preemption (§(e)(2)). State UDAP laws would be unaffected by the Act.

VI.

CONCLUSION

The number of deceptive health claims being made by nutritional product manufacturers is
large and growing. The federal agencies tasked with enforcing the laws that prohibit such claims
are limited in their enforcement actions by statutory and First Amendment constraints but more
significantly by insufficient resources to adequately police this market. State consumer
protection laws are helping in some states to curtail these wrongful claims, but enforcement via
different state laws is likely to lead to inconsistencies across states and with federal enforcement
policies. In response to this expanding problem, we propose a limited private right of action
under the Federal Trade Commission Act to allow state attorneys general and non-profit
organizations to bring enforcement actions in federal court to enforce provisions of the FTC Act
prohibiting deceptive nutritional product claims. Such a right would augment badly needed
protection for consumers without impairing the federal agencies’ enforcement efforts and goals.
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APPENDIX A
Nutritional Products Consumer Protection Act
15 U.S.C. §______.
(a) For purposes of this section:
(1) The terms “food,” “dietary supplement,” “person,” and “State” have the meaning provided
for these terms in the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 321.
(2) The term “nutritional product” means a food or dietary supplement.
(3) The term “authorized plaintiff” means:
(i) The Attorney General of a State; or
(ii) A person that is a tax-exempt organization under § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code.
(b) A person may not commit an unfair or deceptive act or practice, within the meaning of
Section 5 of this Act, in connection with the selling or offering for sale in interstate commerce of
any nutritional product. A person’s use of any material that has been reviewed and approved by
the Food and Drug Administration may not be deemed to be a violation of this subsection.
(c) (1) If any person violates subsection (b) of this section, an authorized plaintiff may
commence a civil action for injunctive relief restraining such violation and for damages in any
United States District Court for a district in which the defendant resides or has an agent.

(2) In any civil action under this subsection, the court may award to an authorized plaintiff the
costs of the suit, including reasonable attorneys’ fees.
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(d) (1) At least 30 days before initiating any action authorized by subsection (c) of this section,
an authorized plaintiff shall timely provide a copy of the complete complaint to be filed and
written notice describing such action, to the Commission and the Food and Drug Administration.

(2) The written notice required under this paragraph shall, at a minimum, describe:
(i) the identity of the parties;
(ii) the alleged facts underlying the proceeding; and
(iii) the relationship, if any, to any proceeding, including any rulemaking, undertaken by the
Commission, the Food and Drug Administration, or another Federal agency.

(3) In any action authorized by subsection (c) of this section, the Commission or the Food and
Drug Administration may—
(i) intervene in the action as a party; and
(ii) appeal any order or judgment, to the same extent as any other party in the proceeding.
(e) Nothing in this section impairs or preempts:
(1) any enforcement authority of the Commission or the Food and Drug Administration; or
(2) any cause of action available to an authorized plaintiff under State law.
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